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ARTICLES 
AN ORDERLY LIQUIDATION AUTHORITY IS 
NOT THE SOLUTION TO TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL 
Roberta S. Karmel* 
INTRODUCTION 
The preamble to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) declares that one of the statute’s primary 
purposes is “to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by 
ending bailouts.”1 Similarly, when President Obama signed this bill, he 
declared that “the American people will never again be asked to foot the bill 
for Wall Street’s mistakes. There will be no more taxpayer-funded bailouts, 
period.”2 The primary techniques for preventing future bailouts of financial 
institutions in Dodd-Frank are the improved regulation of banks, especially 
by way of capital controls, the regulation of systemically significant 
financial institutions, and the creation of an orderly liquidation authority for 
failed firms.3 Unfortunately, the political outlawing of “too big to fail” 
represents the triumph of hope over experience. 
Although Dodd-Frank is an improvement over the financial regulatory 
system that preceded it, it will not abolish “too big to fail” because the 
major banks and other financial institutions in the capital markets are too 
bigbigger now than they were before the meltdown of 2008and too 
complicated. Furthermore, these financial institutions have grown to their 
current size and shape because they were permitted, and even encouraged, 
to do so by the very same financial agencies that are now supposed to do a 
better job of regulating them. These regulators did so for a variety of 
reasons that have not been altered by Dodd-Frank. 
First, politicians, regulators, and CEOs do not care to preside over 
failure, and generally have the ability to “kick that can down the road” for a 
long time. Large government bureaucracies find it easier to deal with large 
businesses than small businesses, but the consequences of closing down a 
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 1. H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., pmbl. (2d Sess. 2010). 
 2. Frank James, Obama: Financial Bill Means ‘No More . . . Bailouts, Period,’ NPR (July 15, 
2010, 6:23 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/07/15/128549117/obama-financial-
bill-means-no-more-bailouts-period. 
 3. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, §§ 171, 204, 804, 124 Stat. 1376, 1435, 1454, 1807 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 5371, 5384, 5463 (2010)). 
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very large business are more severe, and regulators will generally go to 
great lengths to avoid such a bankruptcy. Second, in order to protect the 
federal deposit insurance fund (and similar insurance facilities), financial 
regulators have presided over shotgun marriages between distressed banks 
and other apparently stronger institutions, regardless of whether these 
combinations flouted restrictions against such marriages, or resulted in 
larger but weaker financial institutions. Third, growth and size gives banks 
advantages that they do not wish to forgo. The larger an organization, the 
greater the compensation a CEO can claim and the more influence the 
organization can exercise politically. Even when regulators have not been 
captured politically by the industries that they regulate, they have been 
complicit facilitators of bank growth because they believe that size makes 
banks sounder. Unfortunately, as a liquidator of a failed broker-dealer once 
said to me, “When you put two dogs together, all you get is a bigger dog.” 
Fourth, globalization and regulatory competition have made regulators 
fearful of losing entities under their jurisdiction to other authorities. As a 
result, regulators have cooperated with the financial institutions that they 
regulate in expanding the size and types of businesses in which they are 
engaged. 
In Part I, this Article will set forth the provisions of Dodd-Frank that 
deal with the mechanisms for closing banks and providing liquidity in a 
financial crisis, and suggest that, although the orderly liquidation 
procedures of Dodd-Frank might make the resolution of a failed mega-bank 
less chaotic, these procedures will not prevent any financial institutions 
from being too big to fail. In Part II, this Article will discuss the dynamics 
behind the creation of the mega-banks: the destruction of the statutorily 
imposed geographical restrictions on banking and the separation of 
commercial and investment banking through interpretations by the banking 
regulators that were first upheld by the courts, and much later endorsed by 
Congress. Part II will also recount how some of the biggest banks grew 
through mergers and acquisitions that were at times strategic, but at other 
times, could be more accurately described as an opportunistic response to 
the failure of another bank. My analysis has been informed by my own 
experiences as a financial regulator and lawyer for some of the players in 
this story of expansion. Part III of this Article will discuss various 
mechanisms that have been proposed for dealing with the size and 
complexity of the mega-banks.  
I am pessimistic about the value of the Dodd-Frank provisions that 
were designed to prevent future bailouts in the absence of serious structural 
change in the banking world and changes to the financial regulators. 
Nevertheless, I recognize that we cannot go backward to simpler capital 
markets, and therefore, we have to rationalize financial structures in light of 
today’s political and business realities. It is unrealistic to believe that there 
will not be financial bubbles in the future and also not to appreciate that the 
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size and structure of the financial industry means only governments can 
provide the necessary liquidity to stem a financial collapse. Putting 
restraints on the agencies that will be required to act in a crisis, instead of 
providing them with the tools to meet such a crisis, as the resolution 
procedures of Dodd-Frank do to some extent, is shortsighted and 
counterproductive. Moreover, the lack of any political will to tackle the 
economic and political power of the mega-banks means that they are and 
will remain too big to fail. 
I. STATUTORY MECHANISMS FOR CLOSING BANKS AND 
PROVIDING LIQUIDITY IN A FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A. THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION AS 
CONSERVATOR 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was historically 
allowed to offer financial assistance to a bank before the bank became 
insolvent. This was a discretionary power.4 This FDIC policy dictated that 
no request for such assistance should be granted unless the FDIC 
determined that the “financial impact on executive management, directors, 
shareholders and subordinated debt holders [was] comparable to what 
would have occurred if the bank had actually closed.”5 
The decision to close a bank is made by its primary regulator; when 
such a decision is made the FDIC is appointed as conservator of the failed 
institution.6 The FDIC can seize control of a commercial bank that is 
insolvent or approaching insolvency.7 Under its prior statutes, it then had a 
variety of options.8 It could engage in a purchase and assumption 
transaction by transferring the failing bank to a solvent institution,9 
capitalize a new bank or bridge bank,10 become a receiver and liquidate the 
bank, or become a conservator and operate the bank with a view to 
rehabilitation.11 Further, it was allowed to inject liquidity into troubled 
banks to prevent a receivership or conservatorship.12 
One reason the FDIC has a variety of options in liquidating a failed 
bank is that it is obliged to resolve a failed bank under the “least cost” 
                                                                                                                                
 4. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1) (2006). 
 5. Statement of Policy and Criteria on Assistance to Operating Insured Banks Which are in 
Danger of Failing, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,669, 38,670 (Aug. 25, 1983). 
 6. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c); see also Lisa Lamkin Broome, Redistributing Bank Insolvency Risks: 
Challenges to Limited Liability in the Bank Holding Company Structure, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
935, 943 (1993). 
 7. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2). 
 8. See Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving 
the Distress of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 455–57 (2009). 
 9. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(d)(2)(G), 1823(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
 10. See id. § 1821(m)–(n). 
 11. See id. § 1821(d)(2)(D)–(E). 
 12. See id. § 1823(c)(8). 
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method.13 This means that the FDIC must resolve the failed bank in a way 
that is “least costly to the deposit insurance fund of all possible methods for 
meeting [its] obligations.”14 Because of this need to protect the deposit 
insurance fund, the FDIC and other regulators customarily attempted to 
persuade another financial institution to assume the liabilities and acquire 
the assets of a failed or failing bank. Therefore, as banks failed in various 
financial crises over the years, the regulators made every effort to find 
marriage partners for insolvent banks and, in the process, helped to create 
the mega-banks that exist today. 
Under Dodd-Frank, although the FDIC’s powers are curtailed in certain 
ways, the FDIC now has the power to resolve systemically important 
nonbanking financial institutions and financial institution holding 
companies in much the same way that the agency has previously resolved 
failed banks. Under the new liquidation authority, the Treasury Secretary 
would have the authority to appoint the FDIC as receiver of any financial 
company if certain conditions are satisfied.15 Unfortunately, a large 
financial holding company is much more complicated than a bank, and in 
such a situation, liquidation of the failed firm, not rehabilitation, is the 
FDIC’s only option.  
Absent the need to liquidate, the FDIC may provide a wide range of 
financial assistance for the resolution of a covered financial company: this 
includes making loans to; or purchasing debt, purchasing assets, assuming 
or guaranteeing obligations, taking liens on assets, and selling or 
transferring assets or liabilities of; the covered financial company.16 
Although the FDIC has broad authority to administer the resolution process, 
including the transfer of assets and liabilities to a third party or bridge 
financial company,17 it remains to be seen whether the agency has the 
expertise or manpower to resolve a mega-bank holding company.  
B. LIQUIDITY FUNDING 
In a financial crisis, some firms may be insolvent in that, even upon 
liquidation, the value of their assets will not sufficiently offset their 
liabilities. Other firms may suffer a liquidity crisis, so that if a liquidity 
provider is available, the value of their assets will rebound, and they will be 
able to continue in business. In the financial crisis of 2008, liquidity 
funding through various methods was given to systemically important 
financial institutions by the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) and the FDIC. 
                                                                                                                                
 13. Id. § 1823(c)(4). 
 14. See id. § 1823(c)(4)(ii). 
 15. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 201(a)(8), 124 Stat. 1376, 1443 (2010) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5374 (2010)). 
 16. Id. § 210. 
 17. See id. § 210(1)(D), (G). 
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This liquidity funding was then augmented by funding from the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP).18 
Although it was not clear that the Fed and the FDIC had statutory 
authority to rehabilitate insolvent financial institutions, they used what 
authority they could find to do so. Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act19 allows the Fed to make emergency loans to individual companies, 
subject to three requirements: first, “unusual and exigent circumstances” 
must exist; second, no fewer than five members of the Fed must approve 
the loans; and third, the Fed must obtain evidence that the borrower is 
unable to secure adequate credit from other banking institutions.20 
Historically, the Fed has rarely used this power; additionally, it was only an 
amendment to the banking laws after the 1987 stock market crash that 
allowed it to extend such credit to nonbanking institutions.21 This 
amendment to the Fed’s powers also relaxed the collateral requirements for 
such loans.22 
The Obama administration initially requested legislation to broaden the 
Fed’s powers under § 13(3),23 but Dodd-Frank restricts such powers. 
Previously, the Fed was allowed to make loans to individual companies, but 
it can no longer unilaterally do so; but now, emergency lending must be 
approved by the Treasury and monitored by Congress. Emergency lending 
must also be backed by collateral that is sufficient to protect taxpayers.24 
During the financial crisis, the FDIC used the “systemic risk exception” 
to its normal receivership rules to establish the Temporary Liquidity 
Guaranty Program. This program afforded federally insured depositories the 
ability to issue unsecured short-term debt with a federal government 
guarantee. After Dodd-Frank, however, the FDIC can only extend such 
credit to solvent banks. Further, the Fed and the FDIC must agree that a 
liquidity event has occurred and place limits on the guarantees to financial 
institutions so that they will not be a source of moral hazard.25 
                                                                                                                                
 18. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2(1), 122 Stat. 
3765, 3766 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008)); see also James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The 
Battle to Save the American Financial System, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 79. 
 19. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343(A)–(E) (2006). 
 20. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political 
Economy of Systemic Risk Management 30 (Colum. L. and Econs., Working Paper No. 369, 2010; 
Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 277, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1553880 (2010). 
 21. See id. at 33–34. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3).  
 24. Id. § 13(3)(B)(i). 
 25. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1104, 124 Stat. 1376, 2120 (2010) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5611 (2010)). 
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The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act26 provided for the 
government purchase of assets from distressed financial institutions up to 
the expenditure of $800 billion. Although it was initially envisioned that the 
government would purchase toxic, illiquid assets held by financial 
institutions, these funds were actually used to buy preferred stock in nine 
major financial institutions for a total of $125 billion, and to otherwise 
recapitalize failing financial firms. While much of the TARP money used to 
stabilize the financial system has been repaid, this program was widely 
criticized as a “bailout” and led to certain of the restrictions on the Fed and 
others to prevent future liquidity assistance to distressed financial 
institutions. 
In my opinion, all of these restrictions portend that, when there is a 
future financial crisis, the financial regulators may have less, rather than 
more, flexibility both in determining how to deal with the crisis and in 
injecting liquidity that may be needed into the financial system. One 
problem is the funding mechanism for the new orderly liquidation authority. 
Although the Senate bill provided for a fund of $50 billion, to be created 
over a period of five to ten years and to be held by the Treasury, the final 
version of Dodd-Frank provides for funding of any money expended by the 
FDIC in resolving troubled financial institutions only after the fact. In order 
to function as receiver, the FDIC is authorized to issue obligations and 
borrow funds in the first thirty days of a receivership for 10 percent of the 
book value of assets of the company in receivership, and thereafter the 
FDIC may borrow up to 90 percent of the fair value of the assets of the 
company that are available for repayment.27 Next, the FDIC must establish 
an assessment process to repay the obligations issued by it as receiver in 
connection with the liquidation within sixty months. If it is not repaid, then 
the FDIC must levy an assessment on bank holding companies with 
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more, and on nonbank financial 
companies supervised by the Fed as systemically significant financial 
institutions and other financial companies with assets of $50 billion or 
more.28 
The rationale of Dodd-Frank is firstly, that improved supervision and 
regulation by the financial regulators will prevent financial institution 
failures; and secondly, that individual firms that fail, notwithstanding these 
measures, should be liquidated. This rationale is very troublesome because 
the statute neither changes the basic structure of the financial services 
industry, nor significantly curbs the size, powers, or activities of financial 
holding companies, but continues to rely on the very same regulators who 
                                                                                                                                
 26. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 107, 122 Stat. 
3765, 3817 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5217 (2008)). 
 27. Dodd-Frank Act, § 210(n)(6), 124 Stat. 1507 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390). This ability to 
borrow is limited by agreement with the Treasury Secretary and a repayment plan. 
 28. See id. § 210(o)(1). 
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failed to prevent the 2008 meltdown. Although Dodd-Frank makes many 
improvements in the regulation of financial institutions, in my opinion, 
these improvements are insufficient to prevent future financial bubbles and 
their inevitable puncture. Financial crises have different immediate causes, 
and therefore are difficult to predict; further, financial bubbles come from 
psychological delusions and generally are pricked by recognition of reality. 
Why should regulators, however well intentioned, be presumed to have the 
vision and foresight that market place participants are lacking? 
II. HOW THE MEGA-BANKS GREW 
A. OVERVIEW 
According to Henry Kaufman, the greatest failing of Dodd-Frank was 
one of design:  
[T]he act did not deal correctly with the problem of the extraordinary 
concentration of assets held by a small number of large financial 
institutions. . . .  
The new legislation supposedly heightens surveillance over these 
giant institutions, and allows regulators to engineer their orderly 
dissolution. This sounds plausible, but on closer examination amounts 
only to a new protective ring around these institutions, an arrangement 
posing huge risks. . . . For where will their assets end up, if not in the 
hands of the federal government, or one of the remaining giants?29 
I could not agree more. 
In another article, I have argued that the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act should be examined to provide a model for breaking up the 
mega-banks, just as the public utility holding companies were broken up 
after the 1929 stock market crash.30 I will not repeat that analysis here. 
Rather, I will tell the story of how the federal bank regulators expanded the 
business models of banks by punching holes in the Glass-Steagall Act 
(Glass-Steagall)31 wall that separated commercial and investment 
bankinga wall that was finally knocked down by the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley)32and how these same regulators 
approved the mergers and acquisitions that led to the creation of the three 
mega-banks that dominate banking today. The sad fact is that the regulatory 
failures of the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC or 
                                                                                                                                
 29. Henry Kaufman, America Must Start Again on Financial Regulation, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2010, at 11. 
 30. Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model for Breaking Up 
the Banks that are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 821 (2011). 
 31. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 335, 
377, 378). 
 32. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat. 
1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). 
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the Comptroller) and the FDIC allowed banks to grow into the gargantuan, 
complex, and unwieldy holding companies that became too big to fail. 
During the period of 1980 to 1994, regulators approved a record 
number of mergers33: the Fed approved 4,507, the OCC approved 972, and 
the FDIC approved 868.34 Furthermore, the regulators failed to regulate the 
blatant use of bank holding companies as a vehicle for circumventing 
interstate banking and activities restrictions. These regulatory actions, and 
in many cases omissions, resulted in expansionary branching and 
hyperactive merger activity. 
Today, the three largest bank holding companies are Bank of America 
Corporation (Bank of America), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan 
Chase), and Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup).35 These three companies were 
allowed or encouraged to acquire major investment banking organizations.36 
Notably, the predecessors to these companies include the top merger-active 
firms during the period of 1980 to 1994, including the top six: Citicorp, 
BankAmerica Corp. (BankAmerica), Chemical Banking Corp. (Chemical 
Bank), NationsBank Corp. (NationsBank), J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc. (J.P. 
Morgan), and Chase Manhattan Corp. (Chase). Bank of America’s 
predecessors include BankAmerica and NationsBank. During the financial 
crisis, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch & Co. (Merrill Lynch). 
JPMorgan Chase is an amalgamation of Chemical Bank, J.P. Morgan, and 
Chase. During the financial crisis, JPMorgan Chase, with financial 
assistance from the Fed, acquired Bear Stearns & Co. Citigroup has, as one 
of its predecessors, Citicorp. Citicorp already owned Smith Barney & Co. 
and Solomon Bros.; and as a result of its acquisition of Travelers Group, it 
challenged Congress to enact Gramm-Leach-Bliley. The aggressive merger 
activity of these predecessor banks, all of which were approved by bank 
regulators, contributed to the development of today’s three largest bank 
holding companies. Each of these banks was deemed “too big to fail,” and 
each was assisted or rescued by the federal government during the financial 
crisis of 2008. 
                                                                                                                                
 33. Stephen A. Rhoades, Bank Mergers and Industrywide Structure, 1980–94, at 1 (Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Staff Studies Series No. 169, 1996). 
 34. Id. at 19. 
 35. The Fed’s June 30, 2011 performance reports indicate that Bank of America had total 
assets of $2,264,435,837,000, JPMorgan Chase had total assets of $2,246,764,000,000, and 
Citigroup had total assets of $1,956,626,000,000. Top 50 Bank Holding Companies, NAT’L INFO. 
CTR., http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx (data as of June 30, 2011) (to 
access the performance reports, follow the hyperlink of the relevant company; then under “Bank 
Holding Company Performance Report (BHCPR),” highlight “2011-6-30” and click “Create 
Report”; then follow the “Your request for a financial report is ready” hyperlink after it appears). 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 277–83, 307–09, 340–46. 
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B. DESTRUCTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND ACTIVITIES 
RESTRICTIONS 
Some of the important restrictions on banks designed to prevent 
excessive concentration of financial power were the prohibitions against 
branching interstate and intrastate. These restrictions were based on a desire 
to control banks at a community level, to have and encourage close 
relationships between bankers and borrowers within those communities, 
and to avoid centralized financial power.37 When the federal banking 
system was established in 1864, the National Banking Act allowed banks to 
be either chartered as a state or a national bank, but national banks were not 
permitted to branch.38 In 1927, Congress authorized national banks to open 
a limited number of branches in local communities if the law of that state 
permitted state-chartered banks to do so; then, by way of a 1933 
amendment, it provided national banks with full equality to branch 
throughout their home state to the same extent the state permitted its own 
banks to branch.39 
In the 1940s and 1950s, banks formed bank holding companies as a 
device around the restrictions on interstate and intrastate branching. The 
holding company structure allowed a bank to effectively create a branch in 
different states or communities even though branching was not allowed.40 
The Douglas Amendment of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
(BHCA)41 partially closed this end run around geographic restrictions by 
prohibiting a bank holding company from acquiring an interstate bank 
unless there was explicit statutory authorization by the state where the bank 
to be acquired was located.42 
In the early 1990s, Congress finally ended branching restrictions by 
passing the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994 (Riegle-Neal).43 A number of reasons were given for the statute, 
including: the concern that geographic banking restrictions hindered the 
                                                                                                                                
 37. Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J. LEGIS. 255, 255 (1995). 
 38. See generally National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (repealed 1953); see also 
First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 655–58 (1924) (holding that national 
banks are prohibited from branching). 
 39. McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 
(2006)); Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 37, at 257. 
 40. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 37, at 257 (quoting Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Act of 1994, S. REP. NO. 103-240, at 6 (1994)). 
 41. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2000)), repealed in part by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 42. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 37, at 258. As some states recognized the benefits holding 
companies offered in terms of attracting new investment capital to their states, this restriction 
slowly eroded but in some cases was limited by reciprocity requirements. Id. 
 43. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 2338. 
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competitiveness of the U.S. banking industry; and the belief that interstate 
branching would promote diversification of bank assets and loan portfolios, 
and that greater customer convenience and choice would result.44 Riegle-
Neal allowed bank holding companies to acquire separate banks in multiple 
states as long as the Fed found the holding company adequately capitalized 
and managed. In addition, the OCC was authorized by Riegle-Neal to 
approve the establishment and operation of interstate national bank 
branches,45 and the FDIC was similarly authorized to approve interstate 
branches of insured state nonmember banks.46 
Some of the cases that will be discussed below relate to efforts by the 
banking regulators to allow national banks to expand across state lines, thus 
undermining the restriction on interstate banking. The most important 
activities and conflict of interest restrictions for purposes of this Article, 
however, were those in Glass-Steagall, which was passed in 1933 as an 
important part of the New Deal effort to restore public confidence in the 
country’s financial system. It was linked with the passage of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act,47 which provided federal insurance for retail bank 
accounts. This legislation had two types of provisions separating investment 
and commercial banking. Direct combinations were regulated under § 16 of 
the Banking Act of 1933, which prohibited national banks and state banks 
that were members of the Federal Reserve System from purchasing, 
underwriting, or dealing in securities, except as provided in the Act.48 
Additionally, § 21 prohibited institutions involved in underwriting, selling, 
or distributing securities from also taking deposits.49 
The second type of provision prevented indirect combinations. Section 
20 prohibited Federal Reserve System member banks from being affiliated 
with any organization engaged in the issuance, underwriting, public sale, or 
distribution of non-exempt securities.50 Section 32 prohibited Federal 
Reserve System and state member banks from sharing personnel with 
entities primarily engaged in the issuance, underwriting, public sale, or 
distribution of securities.51 
The restrictions that were placed on bank holding companies were 
driven by two impetuses: the threat of concentration that widespread 
interstate banking posed, and the fear that the economic system would be 
                                                                                                                                
 44. Mulloy & Lasker, supra note 37, at 266, 269. 
 45. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2006). 
 46. Id. § 1828(d)(4) (amended 2010). 
 47.  Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1835a 
(2006)). 
 48. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1934) (amended 1999).   49. Id. § 378 (amended 1978).   50. Id. § 377 (repealed 1999).   51. Id. § 78 (repealed 1999). 
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dominated by colossal banking and industrial conglomerates.52 Therefore, 
restrictions on the nonbank activities of bank holding companies were 
designed to prevent a bank holding company from performing activities that 
could not be performed directly by a bank. Many commercial businesses 
feared that firms affiliated with banks could gain a competitive advantage 
over unaffiliated competitors in the same industry if they were in a position 
to receive preferential credit treatment from the banks.53 Also, business and 
policy leaders feared that access to credit would be tied to the purchase of 
services from a bank’s nonbank affiliates.54 
As a result, the BHCA severely restricted nonbank activities and only 
permitted those activities incidental to banking or performing services for 
banks, such as ownership of the bank’s premises, auditing and appraisal, 
and safe deposit services.55  
In general, the law required that nonconforming nonbank businesses be 
divested over a period of years, but the [Fed] was given the power to allow 
retention of activities in the areas of banking, finance, or insurance, if 
these activities were “. . . so closely related to the business of banking or 
of managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto. . . .”56 
During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the bank regulators and Congress 
engaged in a general deregulation of banking that, over time, permitted 
banks, especially large-money-center banks, to engage in most aspects of 
the securities business. Illustrative of the de-regulatory initiatives of the 
banking authorities are a series of rulings, many of which were contested by 
the Securities Industry Association (SIA),57 a trade association that relaxed 
the activities restrictions of the banking statutes. In 1974, the OCC 
interpreted Glass-Steagall to allow banks to offer computer-assisted stock 
purchasing services to checking account employees. Then, in 1982, the 
OCC allowed such services to be extended to existing banking and also 
nonbanking clients. Further, this interpretation applied to the brokerage 
activities of the bank itself, as well as a bank subsidiary.58 
The SIA eventually challenged the brokerage activities of national 
banks in Clarke v. Securities Industry Association. The case involved two 
                                                                                                                                
 52. J. Nellie Liang & Donald T. Savage, The Nonbank Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 
76 FED. RES. BULL. 280, 281 (1990). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (alteration in original). 
 57. In 2006, the SIA and the Bond Market Association merged to create the Securities Industry 
and Financial Markets Association. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Merger of Wall Street Groups Creates a 
Lobbying Powerhouse, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2006, at D1, available at http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/26/AR2006112600647.html. 
 58. Cf. Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 634–35 (1971) (describing the OCC’s “position 
that the operation of a bank investment fund is consistent with [Glass-Steagall] because 
participating interests in such a fund are not ‘securities’”). 
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national banks, Union Planters National Bank of Memphis (Union Planters) 
and petitioner Security Pacific National Bank of Los Angeles (SPN), that 
had applied to the OCC for permission to open offices offering discount 
brokerage59 services to the public.60 Both banks wanted to offer discount 
brokerage services at their branch offices and other locations inside and 
outside of their home states.61 Union Planters sought permission to acquire 
an existing discount brokerage operation, and SPN hoped to establish an 
affiliate named Discount Brokerage.62 Upon review of the applications, the 
Comptroller approved both SPN’s and Union Planters’ applications.63 
SPN’s application to the OCC raised the issue of whether the operation 
of a discount brokerage violated the National Bank Act’s branching 
provisions.64 The Comptroller approved SPN’s application, concluding that 
“the non-chartered offices at which Discount Brokerage will offer its 
services will not constitute branches under the McFadden Act because none 
of the statutory functions will be performed there.”65 The SIA brought suit 
arguing that bank discount brokerage offices were offices within the 
meaning of § 36(f), and were subject to the geographical restrictions 
imposed by § 36(c).66 
The Supreme Court held that respondent had standing to maintain the 
lawsuit, and that the Comptroller did not exceed his authority in approving 
SPN’s application.67 First, the Court emphasized the great weight given to 
the Comptroller’s interpretations.68 Second, the Court rejected the SIA’s 
argument that the Comptroller’s interpretation of the National Bank Act 
                                                                                                                                
 59. A discount brokerage house executes trades on behalf of customers at a reduced 
commission but does not offer investment advice. Discount Broker Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/discountbroker.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).  
 60. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 390–91 (1987). 
 61. Id. at 391. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 392. 
 64. Id. at 391. The McFadden Act limited the “general business” of a national bank to its 
headquarters and any branches permitted by § 36. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 81). Section 36(c) 
provided that a national bank was permitted to branch only its home state and only to the extent 
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“branch” was defined as “any branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any 
branch place of business . . . at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.” Id.  
§ 36(j).  
 65. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 391. 
 66. Id. at 392–93. 
 67. Id. at 394. 
 68. Id. at 403. 
It is settled that court should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a 
regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. 
The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an 
extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative 
conclusions as to meaning of these laws.  
Id. (citing Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1971)). 
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contradicted the plain language of 12 U.S.C. § 81 when it broadly 
interpreted § 81 as delineating that “national banks may locate their 
business only at their headquarters or licensed branches within the same 
state.”69 The Court reasoned that § 81 did not need to be read to encompass 
all the businesses in which the bank engages, but could be read to cover 
only those activities that were part of the bank’s core banking functions.70 
Therefore, the Court found that the Comptroller’s position that “the 
amendment [to the National Bank Act] simply codified the accepted notion 
that the ‘usual business’ of a bank was the ‘general banking business.’”71 
Because the Court deferred to the Comptroller’s liberalization of the 
restrictions on national banks, this decision gave a green light to the further 
deregulation of banking by the OCC and the Fed. 
In a key ruling regarding the sale of securitized mortgages, the OCC 
determined that the sale of mortgage pass through certificates by SPN was 
not in violation of Glass-Steagall.72 The Comptroller concluded that 
the Bank’s program, as described in the Prospectus and Prospectus 
Supplement dated January 23, 1987, is squarely based on long-standing 
precedent that is fully supported by applicable law and subsequent court 
decisions interpreting these laws. In pooling its mortgage loans and selling 
interests therein, the Bank is merely engaging in a permitted sale of its 
mortgage assets. We cannot conclude that the Glass-Steagall Act is 
intended to preclude banks from conducting this activity.73 
The SIA challenged this ruling in Securities Industry Association v. 
Clarke, claiming that the Comptroller’s ruling was “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, in excess of his statutory authority and otherwise not in 
accordance with the law, and that it is, therefore, null and void.”74 Although 
the district court granted the SIA’s motion for summary judgment, finding 
that the Comptroller’s decision violated federal law,75 the Second Circuit 
vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss 
the complaint.76 The Second Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s explicit 
guidance in Clarke v. Securities Industry Association that “courts should 
give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute 
adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute.”77 
The Second Circuit extensively reviewed the Comptroller’s findings. 
The Comptroller found that national banks had the authority to sell their 
                                                                                                                                
 69. Id. at 405–06. 
 70. Id. at 406. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1036 (2d. Cir. 1989). 
 73. Id. at 1038. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1052. 
 77. Id. at 1042. 
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mortgage loans generally on three grounds: (1) “since the enactment of the 
National Bank Act of 1864, national banks have had the express power to 
‘carry on the business of banking . . . by negotiating promissory notes . . . 
and other evidences of debt’”; (2) the Supreme Court had held that the sale 
of mortgages was within the incidental powers of national banks; and (3) 
under 12 U.S.C. § 371(a), national banks were permitted to “make, arrange, 
purchase or sell loans or extensions of credit secured by liens on interests in 
real estate.”78 Therefore, the Comptroller determined “it is clearly 
established that national banks may sell their mortgage assets under the 
express authority of 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh) and 371(a).”79 In addition, 
the Comptroller determined that SPN’s use of mortgage-backed pass 
through certificates was either a new way of selling bank assets or an 
activity incidental to an authorized banking practice.80 Furthermore, the 
Comptroller determined that the prohibitions and concerns of Glass-
Steagall were not implicated.81 
Although the Comptroller’s interpretation was arguably broad,82 the 
Second Circuit held that the Comptroller had correctly determined that 
SPN’s sale of the certificates was within the “business of banking.”83 The 
Second Circuit found that the Comptroller’s conclusion that SPN’s activity 
was encompassed by its power to carry on the business of banking, and that 
the Comptroller’s interpretation of § 16 was supported by Bankers Trust I. 
In Bankers Trust I, the Supreme Court distinguished between activities that 
fell within “the business of banking” and the “business of dealing.” The 
Court held that activity that falls within the “business of banking” was not 
prohibited by Glass-Steagall’s § 16.84 Here, the Second Circuit found that it 
was reasonable for the Comptroller to determine that SPN’s activities were 
within the “business of banking,” and therefore, not prohibited by Glass-
Steagall.85 This key ruling on the securitization of mortgages transformed 
the business of mortgage lending from an originate-to-hold model to an 
originate-to-distribute model and essentially allowed banks to become 
underwriters of securities. 
The Fed was also active in allowing banks and bank holding companies 
to expand their business activities in derogation of the geographical and 
activities limitations of the federal banking laws, and courts have generally 
                                                                                                                                
 78. Id. at 1044. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1044–45. 
 81. Id. at 1045. 
 82. See Edward J. Markey, Why Congress Must Amend Glass-Steagall: Recent Trends in 
Breaching the Wall Separating Commercial and Investment Banking, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 457, 
471–72 (1990). 
 83. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1047–48. 
 84. Id. at 1048 (citing Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers 
Trust I), 468 U.S. 137, 158 n.11 (1984)). 
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deferred to the Fed’s interpretations. Of particular significance to this 
Article, the Fed exercises certain supervisory and examination functions 
over state-chartered member banks.86 These powers include “the 
administration of federal laws regulating the formation and activities of 
bank holding companies.”87 In addition, the Fed administers the Bank 
Merger Act which involves mergers where “the acquiring, assuming, or 
resulting bank, is a state chartered member bank[,]” and involves the 
issuance of securities by state-chartered member banks.88 Like the OCC, the 
Fed enabled banks to enter the discount brokerage business when 
BankAmerica Corp. (BankAmerica), a bank holding company predecessor 
to Bank of America, applied for approval to acquire 100 percent of the 
voting shares of The Charles Schwab Corp. and its retail brokerage 
subsidiary, Charles Schwab & Co. (Schwab). The Fed approved 
BankAmerica’s application, thereby raising the issue of whether the Fed 
had the statutory authority under § 4(c)(8) of the BHCA to authorize a bank 
holding company to acquire a nonbanking affiliate engaged principally in 
retail securities brokerage.89 
The SIA petitioned for review of the Fed’s decision. First, the SIA 
argued that the Fed could “not approve an activity as ‘closely related’ to 
banking unless it [found] that the activity facilitated other banking 
operations.”90 Second, the SIA argued that § 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibited 
a bank holding company from owning any entity that is engaged principally 
in retail securities brokerage services.91 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit 
held that the Fed acted within its statutory authority and affirmed the Fed’s 
order; upon appeal the Supreme Court affirmed.92 
To qualify for the § 4(c)(8) exception, the Fed was required to 
determine (1) whether the proposed activity was “closely related” to 
banking, and (2) whether allowing BankAmerica to engage in the activity 
may reasonably be expected to produce public benefits that outweigh any 
adverse effects.93 First, the Fed determined that the securities brokerage 
services offered by Schwab were “closely related” to banking because (1) at 
the time, banks offered, as an accommodation to their customers, brokerage 
services that were virtually identical to the services offered by Schwab; (2) 
bank trust department trading desks performed the same functions as 
brokers; and (3) banks engaged in the widespread use of sophisticated 
techniques and resources to execute purchase and sell orders for their 
customers and were therefore equipped to offer the type of retail brokerage 
                                                                                                                                
 86. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION § 1.03[B] at 1-54 (2d ed. 2011). 
 87. Id. at 1-54 to -55 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et seq.). 
 88. Id. at 1-55 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 781(i)). 
 89. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 208 (1984). 
 90. Id. at 213. 
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 92. Id. at 219. 
 93. Id. at 210–11. 
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services provided by Schwab.94 For these reasons, the Fed concluded that a 
securities brokerage business that is “essentially confined to the purchase 
and sale of securities for the account of third parties, and without the 
provision of investment advice to the purchaser or seller is ‘closely related’ 
to banking within the meaning of § 4(c)(8) of the [BHCA].”95 Second, the 
Fed determined that the public benefits likely to result from BankAmerica’s 
acquisition of Schwab outweighed the possible adverse effects.96 It 
reasoned that the acquisition would result in increased competition, 
convenience, and efficiencies in the retail brokerage business,97 and that 
these public benefits outweighed any possible adverse effects of undue 
concentration of resources, decreased competition, or unfair competitive 
prices.98 Third, the Fed concluded that BankAmerica’s acquisition of 
Schwab was not prohibited because Schwab was not “engaged principally 
in any of the activities prohibited to member bank affiliates by the Glass-
Steagall Act.”99 
The Supreme Court rejected the SIA’s first argument that § 4(c)(8) 
required that a proposed activity must facilitate other banking operations 
before it may be found to be “closely related” to banking, reasoning that the 
statute does not specify any factors that the Fed must consider in making 
that determination.100 Since the Fed’s interpretation is entitled to the 
“greatest deference,” the Court held that the court of appeals properly 
deferred to the Fed’s determination.101 The Court also rejected the SIA’s 
second argument that the term “public sale” of securities in § 20 applied to 
brokerage businesses, reasoning that statutory interpretation and legislative 
history supported the Fed’s interpretation that brokerage services were not 
prohibited by the statute.102 
Another milestone in dismantling the Glass-Steagall wall was the Fed’s 
grant of authority to banks to sell and underwrite commercial paper. 
Although the Fed initially lost its argument that commercial paper was not a 
“security” under Glass-Steagall,103 it won the argument that agency sales of 
commercial paper were not “underwriting.”104 In Bankers Trust I, Bankers 
Trust Company (Bankers Trust), a state commercial bank that was a 
member of the Federal Reserve System began serving as agent for several 
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of its corporate customers and marketing their commercial paper.105 The 
SIA petitioned the Fed for a ruling that such activities were unlawful under 
§§ 16 and 21.106 The Fed ruled that commercial paper fell outside the 
proscriptions of Glass-Steagall.107 
The Fed reasoned that if a particular kind of financial instrument 
evidenced a transaction that was more functionally similar to a traditional 
commercial banking operation than to an investment transaction, then the 
instrument should not be viewed as a “security” for purposes of Glass-
Steagall.108 Applying this “functional analysis” to commercial paper, the 
Fed concluded that such paper more closely resembled a commercial bank 
loan than an investment transaction and that it was, therefore, not a 
“security” for purposes of Glass-Steagall.109 Having come to this 
conclusion, the Fed “did not consider whether Bankers Trust’s involvement 
with commercial paper constituted ‘underwriting’ within the meaning of 
[Glass-Steagall].”110 
In response, first, the SIA argued that commercial paper constituted a 
“note” within the meaning of § 21, and alternatively, that it was 
encompassed by the inclusive term “other securities.”111 Second, the SIA 
argued that the role played by Bankers Trust in placing the commercial 
paper of third parties was precisely the type of activity prohibited by Glass-
Steagall.112 The Fed reasoned that Congress intended a narrower definition, 
and that Glass-Steagall was meant to prohibit the underwriting of only those 
notes that share “that characteristic of an investment that is the common 
feature of each of the other enumerated instruments.”113 The Supreme Court 
rejected the Fed’s reasoning because the legislative history strongly 
suggested that Congress’ use of “security” encompassed “note.”114 The 
Court specifically pointed to the Securities Act of 1933, which defines the 
term “security” to include “any note.”115 The Court held that commercial 
paper was a “security” under Glass-Steagall and, therefore, was subject to 
its proscriptions.116 The Court remanded the case to the lower court to 
determine whether Bankers Trust’s placement of commercial paper 
constituted the “underwriting” or “business of issuing, underwriting, selling 
or distributing” that Glass-Steagall prohibited.117 
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Upon remand, the Fed found that Bankers Trust’s placement of 
commercial paper constituted a § 16 violation—the “‘selling’ of a security 
without recourse and solely upon the order and for the account of 
customers.”118 Although the district court granted summary judgment for 
the SIA, holding that Bankers Trust’s activities involved “underwriting” 
and “distributing” that was prohibited by § 21,119 the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia reversed the lower court’s decision, reinstating the 
Fed’s decision.120 
The circuit court began its analysis by stating that the Fed’s decision 
was to be given “substantial deference.”121 First, the court looked at whether 
the commercial banking activities of Bankers Trust fell within the 
parameters of § 16.122 The court found reasonable the Fed’s determination 
that Bankers Trust’s activities fell within § 16’s requirement that  
the business of dealing in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be 
limited to purchasing and selling such securities without recourse, solely 
upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its 
own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite any issue of securities of 
stock.123 
In response, the SIA, first, argued that the permissive language in § 16 
did not apply to the activities of Bankers Trust because the exception only 
applied to “the business of dealing in securities and stock” and that “dealing 
is typically understood to encompass the purchasing and selling of stock in 
the secondary market.”124 The court rejected this argument because the 
Securities Act of 1934 defines “dealer” as a person who engages in the 
dealing of securities without exclusion of the primary offering market.125 
Second, the SIA argued that the Fed erred in concluding that the activities 
of Bankers Trust were upon the order of customers because (1) it had to be 
limited to preexisting customers of the bank, and (2) the bank solicited the 
business of issuers and gave financial advice about the terms and timing of 
the issue of commercial paper.126 The court rejected this argument, 
determining that (1) § 16 did not restrict the placement of securities to 
preexisting customers,127 and (2) there was no evidence supporting the 
claim that Bankers Trust recruits or solicits the business of issuers.128 Third, 
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the SIA argued that the activities of Bankers Trust amounted to 
“underwriting,” and were therefore barred from the § 16 exemption.129 
Nevertheless, the court found reasonable the Fed’s conclusion that “an 
‘underwriting’ defeats the section 16 exemption only if it includes a public 
offering.”130 
Lastly, the SIA asked the court to analyze the activities approved by the 
Fed to determine whether they posed the “subtle hazards” that Glass-
Steagall sought to eliminate.131 The court determined that the investment of 
bank funds in speculative securities was not at issue because Bankers Trust 
did not purchase the commercial paper of its customers, did not inventory 
the paper overnight, and did not make loans to provide financing to an 
issuer where an offering of paper fell short of its goal.132 Accordingly, the 
court of appeals reversed the district court’s order. 
An even more important event in cracking open the Glass-Steagall wall 
was the Fed’s approval of so-called § 20 subsidiaries that happened when 
the Fed approved applications by large bank holding companies to utilize 
subsidiaries as the vehicle through which to underwrite and deal in certain 
securities.133 The Fed approved the applications of Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & 
Co. Inc., Bankers Trust New York Corp., Chase Manhattan Corp., 
Chemical New York Corp., Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Corporation, and 
Security Pacific Corp., to engage in limited securities activities through 
wholly-owned subsidiaries.134 In response, the SIA petitioned for review, 
arguing that the approved activities violated § 20 of Glass-Steagall.135 
The Fed’s determination that the approved securities were “closely 
related” to banking was not contested on appeal.136 Rather, the main issue 
was whether the approval of the activities contravened Glass-Steagall.137 
First, the Fed reasoned that Congress did not intend in § 20 to proscribe 
bank affiliates from engaging in bank eligible activities since § 16 
authorized banks to engage in underwriting and dealing in governmental 
securities.138 Therefore, the Fed argued that “it would be anomalous not to 
permit the bank’s subsidiary to engage in the activities lawfully permitted 
by the bank.”139 Second, the Fed determined that an affiliate was “engaged 
                                                                                                                                
 129. Id. at 1062. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1066. 
 132. Id. at 1067. 
 133. Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Bankers Trust III), 839 
F.2d 47, 49 (2d. Cir. 1987). 
 134. Id. at 50. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 51. Bank eligible securities are governmental securities; bank ineligible securities are 
those types of securities that under § 16 banks cannot themselves deal in or underwrite. Id. 
 139. Id. 
20 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
principally” in such activity only when there was “substantial activity.”140 
The Fed concluded that subsidiaries would not be engaged substantially in 
bank-ineligible activities if, over a two-year period, such activities 
contributed to no more than 5–10 percent of the total gross revenues of 
those subsidiaries, and if those activities in connection with any type of 
bank-ineligible security constituted no more than 5–10 percent of the 
market for that particular security.141 
The SIA made two arguments. First, the SIA argued that the Fed 
erroneously construed Glass-Steagall, reasoning that § 20 limits both bank 
eligible and bank ineligible securities activities by a member bank 
affiliate.142 Second, the SIA contested the Fed’s construction of “engaged 
principally.”143 The court acknowledged that it was required to uphold the 
Fed’s interpretation of Glass-Steagall if it was reasonable but determined 
that the Fed’s decision was ambiguous.144 The court nevertheless concluded 
that § 20 did not proscribe activities by bank affiliates in bank eligible 
securities. First, the court examined the legislative history and determined 
that Congress, concerned primarily with bank affiliates’ activities in bank 
ineligible securities, did not want to limit all securities activities.145 Second, 
the court examined prior judicial construction and determined that the Fed’s 
interpretation of § 20 was not precluded by the “subtle hazards” analysis146 
because Congress did not believe that the risks were significant when banks 
engaged in activities relating to bank eligible securities as allowed under  
§ 16.147 Therefore, the court concluded that the Fed’s construction of § 20, 
that “securities” did not encompass those securities which § 16 allowed 
banks themselves to underwrite, was reasonable.148 
In another important interpretation of § 20, the Fed concluded that the 
combined provision of securities brokerage services and investment advice 
by a member bank’s affiliate did not contravene § 20’s prohibition of the 
public sale of securities.149 The SIA petitioned the court to review the Fed’s 
decision.150 Nevertheless, the court held that the Fed’s decision was a 
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reasonable interpretation of the language and denied the petition for 
review.151 
In the case, National Westminster Bank PLC and its subsidiary 
NatWest Holdings, Inc. (collectively, NatWest) sought permission from the 
Fed to provide institutional customers with investment advice and securities 
brokerage services through a newly formed subsidiary, County Services 
Corporation (CSC).152 CSC would restrict its brokerage services to buying 
and selling securities solely as agent for the account of its customers, and 
would hold itself out as a separate and distinct corporate entity from 
NatWest.153 The Fed approved NatWest’s application reasoning (1) that 
CSC’s proposed activities were “closely related” to banking, (2) that the 
proposal may be reasonably expected to result in public benefits 
outweighing any possible adverse effects, and (3) that NatWest’s 
acquisition of CSC would not violate Glass-Steagall because the 
combination of investment advice and execution services did not constitute 
a “public sale” of securities.154 
The SIA argued that CSC’s proposed services violated § 20 because (1) 
CSC was offering investment advice, and (2) the activities implicated the 
“subtle hazards” that Glass-Steagall was designed to protect against.155 
Upon review, the court noted, once again, that the Fed’s decision was 
entitled to “substantial deference” so long as its interpretation of statute was 
reasonable.156 First, the court held that the Fed’s construction of a “public 
sale” was reasonable and that the addition of investment advice to 
brokerage activities did not implicate any activities which were traditionally 
associated with underwriting.157 The court rejected the SIA’s argument that 
CSC’s provision of investment advice to its customers transformed the 
proposed activities into the public sale of securities because it was not a 
critical attribute of underwriting.158 Second, the court held that the “subtle 
hazards” analysis was unnecessary because CSC did not conduct activities 
that were prohibited by Glass-Steagallit did not “hold and sell particular 
investments,” or “purchase and sell [securities] on [its] own account.”159 
Similarly, when Chase Manhattan Corporation applied for permission 
for its affiliate, Chase Commercial Corporation (Chase Commercial) to 
underwrite and deal in commercial paper, the Fed approved.160 The Fed 
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reasoned that Chase Commercial’s § 20 activity would not be substantial in 
light of the revenue and market share limitations that it agreed to impose, 
and that its proposal was consistent with the BHCA.161 Again, the SIA 
petitioned for review. In denying the SIA’s petition, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals stated that its review of the Fed’s decision was quite deferential, 
and thus, the court concluded that the Fed’s interpretation of § 20 was 
reasonable.162 First, the court held that “the language and structure of 
[Glass-Steagall] strongly support[ed]” the Fed’s interpretation.163 Second, 
the court held that “neither the legislative history nor the broad purposes of 
[Glass-Steagall] compel[led] the conclusion that the order was based on an 
impermissible construction of the statute.”164 
C. MERGER AND ACQUISITION APPROVALS 
1. Framework for Approvals 
Financial regulators not only cooperated with the banks in tearing down 
the Glass-Steagall wall, but they also approved numerous acquisitions and 
mergers of financial holding companies, sometimes even in derogation of 
prohibitions against such combinations.  
All bank consolidations required the approval of at least one of the 
federal banking agencies: the FDIC, the Fed, or the OCC.165 Under § 3 of 
the BHCA, the Fed must approve all acquisitions and mergers of bank 
holding companies.166 The OCC is the primary banking agency for a 
national bank; the Fed, for a state bank that is a member of the Federal 
Reserve System; and the FDIC, for a state bank that is not a member of the 
Federal Reserve System.167 If the bank consolidation involves both holding 
companies and bank levels triggering both acts, then multiple regulatory 
agencies may be involved.168 
In deciding whether to approve a merger involving a bank holding 
company under the BHCA, the Fed is required to consider: 
(1) [T]he financial history and condition of the company or companies and the 
banks concerned; (2) their prospects; (3) the character of their management; 
(4) the convenience, needs, and welfare of the communities and the area 
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concerned; and (5) whether or not the effect of such acquisition or merger or 
consolidation would be to expand the size or extent of the bank holding 
company system involved beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound 
banking, the public interest, and the preservation of competition in the field of 
banking.169 
The Fed must also notify and request the OCC or the appropriate state 
banking supervisory authority, depending upon whether the bank is a 
national or state bank, to review the application and provide their opinions 
and recommendations.170 
Similarly, in deciding whether to approve an application for a merger 
under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, the appropriate agency is required to 
consider: 
[T]he financial history and condition of each of the banks involved, the 
adequacy of its capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general 
character of its management, the convenience and needs of the community to 
be served, and whether or not its corporate powers are consistent with the 
purposes of . . . [the Federal Deposit Insurance Act] . . . . [T]he appropriate 
agency shall also take into consideration the effect of the transaction on 
competition (including any tendency toward monopoly) . . . .171 
In addition, an application may be not be approved unless the agency 
finds, after reviewing all the factors coupled with the reports from the U.S. 
Attorney General and two other banking agencies, “the transaction to be in 
the public interest.”172 
Generally speaking, the federal regulatory agencies focus on four issues 
when analyzing bank acquisition applications: (1) capital adequacy; (2) 
credit quality; (3) competition; and (4) Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA) compliance.173 
2. Chemical Bank and the Chase Bank Merger (1996) 
Chemical Banking Corp. (Chemical Bank) filed various applications 
seeking the Fed’s approval for the merger of Chemical Bank with The 
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. (Chase Bank).174 The Fed allowed an 
extensive time period for public comment, and held a public meeting to 
afford interested persons the opportunity to present oral testimony on the 
proposed applications.175 In addition, as required by the Bank Merger Act, 
                                                                                                                                
 169. J. William Via, Jr., The Administration of the Bank Merger and Holding Company Acts: 
Confusion Compounded, 51 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1519 (1965) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1964)). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1518 (alteration in original) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)). 
 172. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964)). 
 173. Cohen, supra note 167, at 68 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901, 2906 (1988)). 
 174. Chemical Banking Corporation, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 239, 239 (1996). 
 175. Id. at 240. 
24 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 6 
the Fed requested reports on the competitive effects of the merger from the 
U.S. Attorney General, the FDIC, and the OCC.176 
Chemical Bank had total consolidated assets of approximately $178.5 
billion and operated banks in New York, Delaware, New Jersey, and 
Texas.177 It was the fourth-largest commercial banking organization in the 
country, representing 2.6 percent of total U.S. banking assets.178 It also 
engaged in nonbanking activities nationwide.179 Chase Bank had total 
consolidated assets of approximately $118.8 billion and operated banks in 
New York, Delaware, New Jersey, and Florida.180 It was the eighth-largest 
commercial banking organization of the United States, representing 1.9 
percent of total U.S. banking assets.181 The merger of the two entities 
created the largest commercial banking organization in the United States at 
the time.182 
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2), the Fed cannot approve an application 
for a bank holding company to acquire another bank holding company if the 
effect of the acquisition “may be substantially to lessen the competition . . . 
unless [the Fed] finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable 
effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the 
community to be served.”183 In accord, the Fed examined (1) competitive 
considerations; (2) financial, managerial, and future prospects 
considerations; and (3) convenience and needs considerations.184  
In order to determine the effect of the merger on competition, first, the 
Fed determined the area of effective competition by examining both product 
market and geographic market.185 The Fed concluded that the cluster of 
banking products and services represented the appropriate line of commerce 
for analyzing the effects of this merger application, and that the geographic 
market for the cluster of services was local in nature.186 Second, the Fed 
engaged in the competitive analysis by looking at numerous factors, 
including “the competitive structure of the relevant markets, their 
attractiveness to potential entrants, and the number of competitors that 
would remain.” It found that the consummation of the Chemical-Chase 
merger would not exceed the threshold standard for the Department of 
Justice Merger Guidelines in any of the banking markets in which Chemical 
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Bank and Chase Bank would compete directly, and that many competitors 
would remain in these markets.187 Lastly, the U.S. Attorney General, the 
OCC, and the FDIC did not find that the consummation of the merger 
would result in a significant adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
banking markets.188 
In addition to competitiveness, the Fed looked at capital adequacy, and 
at managerial and future prospect considerations. The Fed determined that 
both Chemical Bank and Chase Bank significantly exceeded the minimum 
capital levels.189 The Fed found that Chemical Bank and Chase Bank could 
achieve cost savings and operational efficiencies as a result of the merger 
through the consolidation of business, and that both holding companies had 
competent and experienced management.190 
As required by the CRA, the Fed also looked at the convenience and 
needs of the communities to be served.191 Chemical Bank received an 
overall CRA performance of “outstanding” from the Fed’s 1995 bank 
examination.192 Chase Bank received an overall CRA performance of 
“satisfactory.”193 The Fed also examined the CRA reports for the subsidiary 
banks of Chemical Bank and Chase Bank, and analyzed the merged entity’s 
future plans to enact certain measures to improve the services it would 
provide to its communities.194 
After reviewing all these factors, the Fed approved the proposed merger 
as effective on January 5, 1996. Although this merger did not involve a 
bank or a derogation of any geographical or activities statutory restrictions, 
it did pave the way for the JPMorgan Chase mega-bank. 
3. Travelers Group and Citicorp Merger (1998) 
Travelers Group (Travelers) was a holding company for securities and 
insurance companies, and Citicorp was a bank holding company under the 
BHCA. Travelers sought the Fed’s approval for it to become a bank holding 
company by merging with Citicorp and acquiring all of its subsidiary 
banks.195 Travelers also requested to acquire Citicorp’s nonbanking 
subsidiaries and investments.196  
Travelers engaged not only in activities that were permissible for bank 
holding companies, but also in nonbanking activities that were not 
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permissible for bank holding companies.197 Approximately 70 percent of 
Travelers’ total assets and 60 percent of its total revenue were related to 
activities that were permissible for bank holding companies under the 
BHCA.198 Additionally, Travelers engaged in certain domestic and 
international nonbanking activities that bank holding companies were 
forbidden from conducting; it proposed to either divest of these activities, 
or to conform them to BHCA requirements.199 Further, Travelers controlled 
several domestic subsidiaries that § 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibited from 
bank affiliation.200 Travelers planned to conform them to Glass-Steagall 
requirements.201  
At the time of the merger, Citicorp had total consolidated assets of $331 
billion, and was the third-largest commercial banking organization in the 
United States and the twenty-second-largest commercial banking 
organization in the world.202 The consummation of the merger created what 
was then, the “largest commercial banking organization in the United States 
and the world.”203 
The Fed determined that Travelers’ proposal to become a bank holding 
company was consistent with the nonbanking limitations in the BHCA 
because new bank holding companies had two years to conform or divest 
themselves of impermissible activities.204 Many commentators urged the 
Fed to hold off on the approval of Travelers until after legislation was 
passed repealing Glass-Steagall.205 Instead, the Fed decided to condition 
approval of the merger upon Travelers’ conformance to the requirements of 
Glass-Steagall. Notably, Sandy Weill, Citicorp’s CEO, rigorously lobbied 
for the repeal of Glass-Steagall after the Fed approved the merger. Shortly 
thereafter, Gramm-Leach-Bliley, to which many referred as the “Citigroup 
Authorization Act,” was passed in 1999.206 
Nonetheless, the Fed still examined (1) competitive considerations; (2) 
financial, managerial, and future prospects considerations; and (3) 
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convenience and needs considerations.207 The Fed determined that Citicorp 
and Travelers both exceeded the relevant capital requirements, and that all 
their subsidiaries were well capitalized.208 The Fed also looked at the 
managerial structure of the merged entity, and found that both Citicorp and 
Travelers had “appropriate risk processes in place,” and that Citigroup was 
“expected to have a risk management structure sufficient to manage the risk 
of a diverse organization.”209 The Fed determined that the consummation of 
the merger would not result in a significant adverse effect on competition 
because Travelers did not own a commercial bank.210 Lastly, the Fed 
determined that Citicorp, Travelers, and their respective subsidiaries, 
received “satisfactory” CRA ratings.211 
4. The Chase Bank and J.P. Morgan & Co. Inc. Merger (2000) 
Chase Manhattan Corporation (Chase) was a bank holding company 
that filed an application with the Fed requesting to merge with J.P. Morgan 
& Co. Inc. (J.P. Morgan), and to acquire J.P. Morgan’s subsidiary bank, 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (Morgan), which was 
located in New York, New York.212 The Fed allowed an extensive time 
period for public comment, but declined a request for a public hearing.213 In 
addition, as required by the Bank Merger Act, the Fed requested reports on 
the competitive effects of the merger from the U.S. Attorney General, the 
FDIC, and the OCC.214 
Chase was the third-largest commercial banking organization in the 
United States: with $396 billion in total consolidated assets, it controlled 
about 6 percent of the total assets of all FDIC-insured commercial banks.215 
Controlling 23.2 percent of the total New York state deposits, it was also 
New York’s largest banking organization.216 Morgan was the fifth-largest 
commercial banking organization in the United States: with $226.3 billion 
in total consolidated assets, it controlled about 4 percent of the total assets 
of all FDIC-insured commercial banks.217 Additionally, it controlled 1.9 
percent of all New York state deposits, thereby making it the fifteenth-
largest New York banking organization.218 After the merger, Chase 
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remained the third-largest commercial banking organization in the nation, 
but with total consolidated assets of $662.3 billion.219 
In order to determine the effect of the merger on competition, first, the 
Fed determined the area of effective competition by examining both the 
product market and the geographic market.220 The Fed concluded that the 
cluster of banking products and services represented the appropriate line of 
commerce for analyzing the effects of this merger application, and that the 
geographic market for the cluster of services was local in nature.221 The Fed 
determined that Chase and Morgan competed directly in the Metropolitan 
New York/New Jersey banking market, the West Palm Beach, Florida 
banking market, and the Wilmington, Delaware banking market.222 Second, 
the Fed reviewed the competitive effects in each of the banking markets by 
considering 
the number of competitors that would remain in the markets, the relative 
shares of total deposits in depository institutions in the markets . . . 
controlled by Chase and Morgan, the concentration level of market 
deposits and the increase in this level as measured by the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index under the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.223  
The Fed concluded that the merger would not result in a significant adverse 
effect on competition in any of the markets where Chase and Morgan 
competed directly, or in any other relevant banking market.224 Chase was 
the largest depository institution in the New York market before 
consummation of the merger, and would remain so after.225 Also, Chase and 
Morgan, then the second- and sixth-largest depository institutions in 
Wilmington, respectively, would merge into an entity that would continue 
to be the second-largest depository institution in the state of Delaware. In 
the West Palm Beach banking market, however, Chase was the fortieth-
largest depository institution and Morgan, the twenty-ninth. Even though 
the consummation resulted in Chase becoming the twenty-fifth-largest 
depository institution in that market, the Fed determined that the market 
would remain moderately concentrated with numerous other competitors 
despite the rise in ranking within that market.226 The Department of Justice 
determined there was no significant adverse effect on competition in any of 
the relevant banking markets, and the FDIC and the OCC did not object to 
the merger.227 
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The Fed also analyzed the capital adequacy and managerial resources of 
Chase and Morgan.228 The Fed observed that Chase and Morgan, and their 
subsidiary depository institutions, were well capitalized and would remain 
well capitalized after consummation of the merger.229 The Fed also found 
that the merger would result in a client base and resources that were more 
diversified,230 and that both Chase and Morgan were adequately 
supervised.231 Therefore, the Fed concluded that the considerations relating 
to the financial and managerial resources, and the future prospects, of the 
organizations and their supervisory factors were consistent with approval.232 
Again, as required by the CRA, the Fed looked at the convenience and 
needs of the communities to be served.233 Both Chase and Morgan received 
“outstanding” ratings,234 while Chase and Morgan’s subsidiaries received 
“outstanding” or “satisfactory” ratings.235 Based on its findings and 
analysis, the Fed approved the Chase and Morgan merger on December 11, 
2000. 
D. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE GROWTH OF THE THREE LARGEST 
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 
1. Bank of America 
As of June 30, 2011, Bank of America Corporation (Bank of America) 
was the largest bank holding company in the United States and one of the 
“big four” banks. Over the course of its history, it grew rapidly by using 
various holding companies to circumvent prohibitions on branch expansion. 
In addition, Bank of America acquired a number of large companies, 
including Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company 
(Continental), NationsBank Corp. (NationsBank), Countrywide Financial 
(Countrywide), and Merrill Lynch & Co. (Merrill Lynch);236 each of these 
acquisitions contributed to it becoming the massive conglomerate that was 
deemed “too big to fail.” In 2008, the federal government infused Bank of 
America with a $45 billion federal bailout through TARP, in addition to 
guaranteeing $300 billion in potential losses.237 
In 1945, Bank of America, National Trust and Savings Association 
(Bank of America NT&SA), predecessor to BankAmerica Corp. 
(BankAmerica) and Bank of America, was the largest bank in the United 
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States. During this time period, there were many state and federal 
restrictions on branch banking.238 National banks were only allowed to 
establish branches in states that granted state banks the right to establish 
branches, and needed to get approval from the OCC.239 As a result, the 
holding company became a vehicle for banks to establish branches in states 
that prohibited branch banking, and for interstate branch banking.240 In 
addition, holding companies were used for mergers and consolidations of 
other banks, and acquisitions of nonbanking companies.241 Bank of America 
NT&SA used its holding company, Transamerica, to circumvent the 
prohibitions on interstate branching and further its expansion goals.242 After 
its formation in 1928, Transamerica acquired a controlling interest in forty-
six banks in five states, acquired 128 other banks which it converted into 
branches, acquired and closed seventy-seven additional banks with 123 
branches, and acquired 23 percent of the outstanding stock of the Citizens 
National Trust and Savings Bank of Los Angeles (Citizens), which had 
thirty-four branches.243 By 1949, Transamerica was the largest holding 
company.244 
The government attempted to reign in Bank of America NT&SA’s 
growth on several occasions, but to no avail. First, the government tried to 
close the loophole that circumvented prohibitions on interstate branch 
banking by introducing a series of anti-bank holding laws and 
regulations,245 none of which would survive.246 After Transamerica’s 
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acquisition of Citizens, the Fed tried to reign in Bank of America NT&SA’s 
expansion by instructing Transamerica to refrain from engaging in any 
future bank-buying negotiations except on the Fed’s recommendations.247 
Bank of America NT&SA’s founder, A.P. Giannini, however, refused to 
comply.248 
The Fed also tried to curb Bank of America NT&SA’s growth by 
conditioning the admission of individual banks into the Federal Reserve 
System.249 When the Fed rejected Bank of America NT&SA’s application 
to open a branch at Lakewood Village, Louisiana, Giannini encouraged the 
formation of a state-chartered institution called Peoples Bank.250 The bank 
was admitted to the Federal Reserve System under the provision that 
Transamerica, Bank of America NT&SA, or any affiliate of either, could 
not acquire stock in it without the Fed’s approval; if this provision was 
violated, Peoples Bank ran the risk of forfeiting its Fed and FDIC 
membership.251 Nevertheless, Transamerica bought stock in Peoples Bank, 
and Peoples Bank challenged the legality of the provision in court.252 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Peoples Bank had nothing to fear 
given the Fed’s failure to enforce the provision depriving it of its 
membership.253 
In 1948, the Fed issued a complaint against Transamerica for violating 
the Clayton Act, which prohibited a corporation from acquiring the stock of 
another corporation that substantially lessened competition or created a 
monopoly.254 In 1952, after almost two years of hearings, the Fed ordered 
Transamerica to divest all of its subsidiary banks and dispose of all of its 
Bank of America NT&SA stock.255 The Fed’s action was overturned by the 
court of appeals, which held that the Fed failed to prove its monopoly 
charges against Transamerica.256 
In addition to Bank of America NT&SA’s expansion domestically, it 
also wanted to open branches internationally.257 The Fed rejected Bank of 
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America NT&SA’s applications to open branches in Germany, although it 
approved its application for Thailand due to special circumstances.258 As a 
result, Bank of America NT&SA created a wholly-owned subsidiary, Bank 
of America International.259 The subsidiary was able to invest in the stock 
of a foreign bank and establish new branches with the consent of both the 
Fed and the foreign country.260 Although Bank of America International 
only opened one branch in Germany, it illustrates yet another example of 
the Fed’s failure to impose regulations to curtail the banks expansionary 
efforts.261 
In 1957, the Fed finally managed to force Transamerica and Bank of 
America NT&SA to separate. Nevertheless, in 1968, BankAmerica was 
formed as a holding company for Bank of America NT&SA and its 
subsidiaries.262 
In the 1980s, Continental was Chicago’s largest bank and one of the top 
ten banks in the United States.263 In 1982, Penn Square Bank, N.A. (Penn 
Square) in Oklahoma failed.264 Continental had purchased $1 billion in oil 
and gas loans from Penn Square and experienced large losses from those 
purchases.265 The failure of Penn Square contributed to Continental’s 
vulnerability and deposit run.266 
Regulators were worried about the impact of Continental’s potential 
failure on at least three other financially vulnerable banks: First Chicago, 
Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Corporation (Manufacturer’s Hanover), and 
Bank of America NT&SA.267 In fact, Manufacturer’s Hanover’s shares 
precipitously dropped after rumors spread about it experiencing funding 
difficulties.268 Because the FDIC was unable to find a merger partner and 
considered a deposit payoff undesirable, the FDIC purchased $4.5 billion in 
bad loans, becoming 80 percent owner of Continental.269 In 1991, 
Continental came out of receivership.270 Ironically, despite being one of the 
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reasons why regulators ended up saving Continental, BankAmerica 
acquired Continental for $1.9 billion.271 
BankAmerica took a major hit in 1998 because it had lent DE Shaw 
$1.4 billion prior to the Russian bond default that caused DE Shaw to suffer 
a significant loss.272 NationsBank seized this opportunity and acquired 
BankAmerica for $64.8 billion; it renamed itself Bank of America.273 The 
resulting entity had combined assets of $570 billion and 4,800 branches 
across twenty-two states.274 Despite the size of this newly forged behemoth, 
federal regulators only forced Bank of America to divest seventeen 
branches in New Mexico.275 
In 2007, Bank of America invested “$2 billion in Countrywide 
Financial, the nation’s biggest mortgage lender and loan servicer.”276 On 
January 11, 2008, Bank of America announced it would buy Countrywide 
for $4.1 billion.277 Shortly thereafter, the housing market collapsed. 
Nonetheless, Bank of America’s purchase of Countrywide made it the 
controlling mortgage loan originator and servicer in the United States.278 
On September 14, 2008, Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch, 
including its portfolio of toxic assets, for $50 billion.279 During 
negotiations, Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis expressed uncertainty 
about proceeding with the merger and argued that the “‘material adverse 
effect’ clause in the merger document could be triggered by Merrill Lynch’s 
deteriorating situation.”280 Lewis claimed the Fed Chairman Ben S. 
Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson strong-armed him into 
completing the deal by threatening to remove top executives.281 
Shareholders approved the deal, but in January 2009, it was revealed that 
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Merrill Lynch suffered massive losses in the fourth quarter.282 
Consequently, the government gave Bank of America an additional $20 
billion in Treasury support and $118 billion of government guarantees. 283 
As Barry Ritholtz explains in his book BAILOUT NATION, Bank of 
America could spin out into five major pieces: Bank of America, Merrill 
Lynch, Countrywide, a toxic holding company, and the rest of its 
holdings.284 This is a result of Bank of America’s aggressive expansion both 
domestically and internationally via branch banking, and its acquisition of 
large, complex companies. Countrywide was the nation’s largest mortgage 
loan originator and lender; with its acquisition, Bank of America obtained 
control of 20–25 percent of the home loan market in the United States, 
making it the largest mortgage originator in the country.285 Merrill Lynch 
was one of the leading investment banks, and its acquisition made Bank of 
America the largest financial services company in the world.286 In addition, 
Bank of America also acquired MBNA, the world’s largest issuer of credit 
cards, and China Construction Bank, China’s second-largest bank. The final 
product is a mammoth holding company in the United States comprised of a 
mishmash of companies: one that was too big to fail . . . and still is. 
2. JPMorgan Chase 
JPMorgan Chase is one of the “big four” banks, and one of the largest 
holding companies in the United States.287 The merger of J.P. Morgan & 
Co. Inc. (J.P. Morgan) and Chase Manhattan Corporation (Chase) resulted 
in the culmination of “four of the largest and oldest money center banking 
institutions in New York City”: J.P. Morgan, Chase, Chemical Bank Corp., 
(Chemical Bank) and Manufacturer’s Hanover Trust Corporation 
(Manufacturer’s Hanover).288 Above all, however, JPMorgan Chase is 
comprised of more than 1,000 predecessor institutions, including Chemical 
Bank.289 
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Over the course of its history, Chemical Bank circumvented state and 
federal regulatory efforts to expand into a massive multibillion-dollar bank 
holding company. For example, in the early 1820s, the New York State 
Assembly needed to approve the charter of banks in New York. During that 
time, the legislature was hostile toward banks, and it was difficult to obtain 
a state charter. It was, however, much easier to get a bank charter approved 
if it was part of another business. Therefore, the founders of the bank 
incorporated the New York Chemical Manufacturing Company to produce 
a variety of chemicals, and petitioned the legislature to amend its charter to 
permit the company to conduct banking activities. In 1844, the chemical 
company was liquidated when the New York Chemical Manufacturing 
Company’s original charter expired, and the company was reincorporated as 
a bank under the more liberal banking laws passed in 1838.290 
Another example is when the Chemical Bank facilitated its expansion 
into other financial areas by forming a bank holding company, Chemical 
New York corporation.291 
In 1982, Chemical Bank announced that it would merge with Florida 
National Banks of Florida, Inc. once interstate banking between New York 
and Florida was permitted.292 
In 1986, Chemical Bank announced a merger with Horizon Bancorp, a 
bank holding company in New Jersey. The actual merger was effected in 
1989, when interstate banking between New York and New Jersey was 
permitted. Horizon was renamed Chemical Bank New Jersey.293 
In 1987, Chemical Bank acquired Texas Commerce Bankshares, one of 
the largest bank holding companies in the Southwest. Texas Commerce was 
the best capitalized, and had the largest affiliate system, amongst the major 
Texan banks. This interstate merger, the largest in U.S. history, allowed 
Chemical Bank to expand into another major banking market.294 
In 1991, Chemical Bank surpassed its Texas merger by consummating, 
what was at the time, the largest bank merger in U.S. history. Its merger 
with Manufacturer’s Hanover ,295 which brought the sixth- and ninth-largest 
U.S. banks together, was called the “first major bank merger among 
equals,” and created the nation’s second-largest bank.296 
Finally, in 1995, Chemical Bank and the Chase announced what would 
be the largest bank merger in U.S. history. Through a $10 billion stock 
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swap merger, the top U.S. bank with $297 billion in assets and $20 billion 
in investable equity, the fourth-largest amount globally, would be formed. 
This institution took the Chase Manhattan name.297 The Fed’s deliberations 
in approving the Chase-Chemical merger are discussed above.298 
Chase Manhattan Corporation was largely comprised of two banks: the 
Bank of Manhattan Company and Chase National Bank. Chase Manhattan’s 
earliest predecessor, the Manhattan Company, was formed in 1799. Aaron 
Burr, although outwardly organizing the company to supply New York with 
clean water to fight the yellow fever, tacitly sought to establish a bank.299 
To do so, he surreptitiously inserted a clause into the company charter, 
authorizing it to use any leftover capital to engage in other business.300 As a 
result, the company was able to create the Bank of Manhattan Company. By 
the time the Bank of Manhattan merged with Chase, it was operating sixty-
seven New York City branches and was “widely regarded as one of the 
most successful and prestigious regional banks in America.”301 
Chase National Bank became one of the biggest of its time through its 
offering of trust services, and through a series of major mergers of banks in 
New York City. Since Chase National Bank was weak on branch banking, 
it merged with Bank of Manhattan Company to capitalize on the latter’s 
extensive branch network throughout New York City.302 
When Glass-Steagall was enacted in 1933, J.P. Morgan & Co., electing 
to pursue commercial banking, “spun off its investment banking business as 
Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated.”303 
In 1940, J.P. Morgan & Co. incorporated in New York, and became J.P. 
Morgan & Co., Inc. In 1959, it merged with Guaranty Trust Company to 
form Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (Morgan). In 1969, 
Morgan became the principle subsidiary of a newly formed bank holding 
company that was also named J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. (J.P. Morgan).304 
J.P. Morgan navigated the investment banking sector outside the United 
States, where Glass-Steagall could have no effect, during the late 1960s and 
1970s. By the late 1980s, however, U.S. restrictions began to loosen.305 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. was formed in 2000, when Chase Manhattan 
acquired J.P. Morgan in a deal valued at about $32 billion.306 JP Morgan 
Chase would later acquire Bear Sterns & Co. Inc. At the start of 2007, Bear 
Stearns & Co. Inc. was the fifth-largest investment bank in the United 
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States; by the end of 2007, however, its market capitalization plummeted, 
prompting the Fed to step in to prevent a wider systemic crisis by offering 
JP Morgan Chase a deal. In 2008, JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear Stearns 
for a $236 million stock swap,307 thereby entrenching itself globally across 
a broad range of businesses, which included prime brokerage, cash clearing, 
and energy trading.308 
Also in 2008, JPMorgan Chase acquired the deposits, assets, and 
certain liabilities of Washington Mutual’s (Wamu) banking operations from 
FDIC receivership, thereby allowing Chase’s consumer branch network to 
expand into California, Florida, and Washington State. This acquisition 
created the nation’s second-largest branch network.309 
3. Citigroup 
Citigroup is one of the “big four” banks, and the third-largest holding 
company in the United States. The company is comprised of several firms 
that eventually amalgamated into Citicorp,310 which subsequently merged 
with Travelers in 1998.311 The resulting mammoth new entity was renamed 
Citigroup.312 As a result of this multibillion megamerger, Citigroup became 
one of the largest, most complex, and unwieldy holding companies in the 
nation.313 This part of the Article focuses on Sandy Weill, the former CEO 
of Citigroup, and his creation of a “financial supermarket” using the 
“growth-by-acquisition” strategy.314 Weill’s acquisition rampage led to both 
Citigroup’s massive growth and its precipitous downfall.315 After the 
financial crisis of 2008, Citigroup needed a $45 billion cash infusion from 
the federal government.316 Notwithstanding this massive bailout, Citigroup 
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was forced to spin off many of its businesses,317 and essentially revert back 
to its pre-Glass-Steagall days.318 Nevertheless, the repeated failure of 
regulators to reign in the banks contributed to Citigroup becoming a 
gargantuan holding company that was deemed too big to fail. 
The story of Sandy Weill’s growth-by-acquisition strategy begins with 
Cogan, Berlind, Weill & Levitt (CBWL), an investment banking and 
brokerage firm in the 1960s.319 In the 1970s, the long bull market came to 
an end and many firms were failing due to poor management and back-
office breakdowns.320 Under Weill’s direction, CBWL acquired a number of 
failing firms at discounted prices, thereby allowing it to grow both in size 
and prestige.321 In 1970, CBWL acquired portions of McDonnell & Co., a 
sixty-five-year-old elite securities firm with twenty-six branch offices 
nationwide.322 The McDonnell acquisition expanded CBWL’s retail 
brokerage business outside of New York City.323 In the same year, CBWL 
also acquired Hayden Stone, a nationwide brokerage house with sixty-two 
branches.324 Subsequently, CBWL changed its name to CBWL-Hayden 
Stone to capitalize on the former firm’s prestige.325 In 1973, CBWL-
Hayden Stone acquired H. Hentz & Co., a prestigious retail brokerage firm 
with a number of branch offices nationwide.326 In all three of these 
acquisitions, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) played a critical role 
in facilitating these fire sales to CBWL.327 Furthermore, in the acquisition 
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of Hayden Stone, the NYSE even agreed to provide CBWL with a $7.6 
million cash infusion and to assume all of Hayden Stone’s liabilities.328 
Following this growth-by-acquisition trend, CBWL went on to acquire 
Shearson Hammill & Co. in 1974;329 Lamson Brothers in 1976; Faulkner, 
Dawkins & Sullivan in 1977; and Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Company 
in 1979.330 The resulting entity was named Shearson Loeb Rhoades.  
In 1981, Prudential Insurance Corporation of America acquired Bache 
Halsey Stuart Shields, creating a financial powerhouse.331 Instead of firms 
consolidating horizontally by buying out their competitors to expand their 
operations, the Prudential-Bache acquisition created a financial 
conglomerate comprised of an insurance company and a securities firm.332 
In order to compete, Shearson Loeb Rhoades allowed American Express to 
buy it for $1 billion.333 The company renamed itself Shearson/American 
Express.334 In 1985, Weill resigned from American Express.335 
Not to be deterred by his struggles at American Express, Weill became 
the CEO of Commercial Credit, a subsidiary of Control Data Corporation in 
1986.336 Again, Weill employed the growth-by-acquisition tactic and started 
building Commercial Credit into a behemoth.337 Commercial Credit 
acquired Primerica Corporation, the receivables and insurance branches of 
Landmark Financial Services, and the consumer-lending operations of 
Barclays American/Financial.338 The firm continued under the name 
Primerica.339 Weill ultimately used Primerica as the vehicle to acquire 
Travelers, which eventually merged with Citicorp to form Citigroup.340 
In April 1998, Travelers merged with Citicorp, the parent company of 
Citibank, to create Citigroup. At the time, Citicorp was the world’s largest 
supplier of credit cards, and Citibank was the second-largest bank in the 
United States. The result was a “financial supermarket”—a one-stop shop 
for insurance, investment banking, banking, brokerage, and other financial 
services.341 Ritholtz marked this as “the moment when Citi went from being 
a very large bank to becoming an unmanageable Goliath.”342 
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The merger of Travelers and Citicorp directly challenged Glass-
Steagall, and under the terms of the Act, Citigroup had two years to divest 
any prohibited assets.343 Opponents of Glass-Steagall included Robert E. 
Rubin, former Treasury Secretary who would eventually become a 
Citigroup board member, and Citigroup’s CEOs Reed and Weill.344 Rubin 
testified in Congress that the Act should be repealed; similarly, Weill and 
Reed aggressively lobbied to overturn Glass-Steagall.345 In 1999, Congress 
passed Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which repealed Glass-Steagall. Significantly, 
many referred to the Act as the “Citigroup Authorization Act.”346 
After the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government infused the 
struggling bank with a $45 billion bailout, and the FDIC guaranteed 90 
percent of its losses on its $335 million portfolio. In 2009, Citigroup 
announced that it would split itself into two companies: Citicorp and Citi 
Holdings, Inc. Citicorp would continue with the traditional banking 
businesses, including retail banking worldwide, investment banking, and 
transaction services for institutional clients. Citi Holdings, Inc. would own 
the toxic assets including asset management and consumer lending, such as 
residential and commercial real estate loans, auto loans, and student loans. 
This marked the end of the Citigroup’s “financial supermarket”347 as the 
firm shrunk back to one third of its original size. The final result is that the 
federal government came to own an astounding 36 percent interest in 
Citigroup. 
Ritholtz writes, “In just about every imaginable way, Citigroup’s 
wounds were self-inflicted. From the gargantuan company that was 
assembled, to the push for repeal of key regulations, to the way it ran daily 
operations—Citi was a classic case of ‘Be careful what you wish for.’”348 
Citigroup grew rapidly due to Weill’s growth-by-acquisition strategy—
buying firms cheap and swallowing up their businesses. In addition, the 
NYSE facilitated and encouraged many of these acquisitions, and the 
legislature repealed the one Act that could have prevented the colossal bank 
failures in 2008. The culmination of all of these events led to the creation of 
a “financial supermarket” that was too big to tame. 
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III. MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH SIZE AND 
COMPLEXITY 
The Dodd-Frank structural mechanisms for dealing with the size and 
complexity of the mega-banks are very limited. Dodd-Frank requires the 
Fed to consider, in the case of a bank acquisition by a bank holding 
company, whether the acquisition “would result in greater or more 
concentrated risks to the stability of the U.S. banking or financial 
system.”349 In the case of a nonbank acquisition, the Fed is required to 
consider whether the acquisition poses any risks to the stability of the U.S. 
banking or financial system.350 There is a comparable provision for other 
financial regulators that may approve a bank acquisition.351 Additionally, 
although prior approval is not generally needed when a financial holding 
company acquires a company that engages in an activity that is financial in 
nature, Fed prior approval will now be needed if the acquisition exceeds 
$10 billion in assets.352 
If the Fed finds that a systemically important company poses a grave 
threat to financial stability, with the approval of two-thirds of the members 
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), the Fed must take 
action to mitigate the risk.353 Such action could include “limit[ing] the 
ability of the company to merge with . . . or otherwise become affiliated 
with another company”; restricting offers of a financial product; ordering 
termination of, or imposing restrictions on, activities; or “requir[ing] the 
company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance sheet items to 
unaffiliated entities.”354 The only other significant structural reform is the 
Volcker Rule, which prohibits any “banking entity”355 from “engag[ing] in 
proprietary trading; or from acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, 
partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a 
private equity fund.”356 
More drastic curtailment of concentration and growth limits has been 
left either to studies or to future Fed rulemaking. Six months after the 
passage of Dodd-Frank, the FSOC was required to complete a study on the 
prohibition on acquisitions by firms where the total assets of the resulting 
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company would exceed 10 percent of aggregate U.S. liabilities.357 The 
FSOC released this study on January 17, 2011.358 Pursuant to the 
requirements of Dodd-Frank, the FSOC made recommendations to the Fed 
on what rules should be passed in order to best implement the concentration 
limit.359 The FSOC made three recommendations. The first two were 
largely procedural, and involved a new definition of “liabilities” so that all 
financial companies would be on equal footing with regard to the 
concentration limit,360 and a change in the way the aggregate liabilities of 
financial companies is calculated so that short-term unexpected events do 
not introduce unintended volatility into the market.361 The third 
recommendation covered the exception to the concentration limit for 
acquisitions of banks in default or in danger of default. The application of 
the exception is subject to the Fed’s approval. The FSOC recommends that 
the exception should be broadened from “banks” to “failing insured 
depository institutions.”362 The issue with this exception, in both its original 
form and the form the FSOC recommends, is that it could make the 
concentration limit superfluous. As covered in the earlier sections of this 
Article, many of the acquisitions made by the too-big-to-fail behemoths 
were of struggling banks and other financial institutions. Furthermore, 
requiring the Fed to consent to the deal is not adequate protection as many 
of these acquisitions were either approved, or, in some instances, suggested, 
by the Fed. This is akin to leaving the fox guarding the henhouse. 
Within nine months of the FSOC study, the Fed must issue rules, taking 
into account the FSOC’s recommendations, limiting merger and acquisition 
transactions that would result in a company holding greater than 10 percent 
of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial companies.363 
Within eighteen months after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the Fed must 
issue concentration limits for large interconnected bank holding companies 
with more than $50 billion in assets and for systemically important nonbank 
financial companies. Among other things, these rules must prohibit such 
companies “from having credit exposure to any unaffiliated company that 
exceeds 25 percent of the capital stock and surplus” of the company.364 
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Others have proposed more drastic limitations on size in order to 
address the disproportionate wealth and power that is concentrated in a 
handful of large banks in the financial sector. Simon Johnson and James 
Kwak have asserted that, without taking action that is focused on the size of 
these institutions, there is no reason to believe the same situation the world 
faced in 2008 will not occur again at the end of the next boom and bust 
cycle.365 Although the Obama administration had used lofty language, its 
proposals, and what resulted from them, did little to get at the main 
problem: “the enormous growth of top-tier financial institutions and the 
corresponding increase in economic and political power.”366 After the 
government rescue in 2008–2009, Wall Street banks effectively emerged 
with “less competition, a strengthened governmental guarantee, and no new 
restrictions on the pursuit of profits.”367 The idea that certain banks were 
“too big to fail” has resulted in a small number of the powerful banks being 
able to adopt riskier policies than their competitors because they, and their 
creditors and counterparties, know that the government will not allow them 
to fail.368  
Johnson and Kwak believe the goal should be a financial system where 
banks can fail without adversely affecting the entire economy.369 They 
dismiss the technocratic approaches of the Obama administration, and 
Dodd-Frank, and instead, drawing support from many, including Alan 
Greenspan, propose a solution: financial institutions should not be allowed 
to grow so big that they cannot fail, and those that already are that big 
should be broken up.370 The argument continues that if there were no banks 
that were too big to fail, there would be no implicit guarantee that the 
government would support some banks and not others. Without such a 
guarantee, creditors and counterparties would be more likely to ensure that 
banks do not take on too much risk, and consequently, banks would not be 
likely to take on excessive risks that could lead to the next financial 
crisis.371  
Johnson and Kwak propose a solution that incorporates the existing 
financial regulations of minimum capital requirements and oversight, with a 
cap on size, whereby “no financial institution would be allowed to control 
or have ownership interests in assets worth more than a certain percentage 
of U.S. GDP. . . . [This number] should be low enough that banks below 
that threshold [can fail] without [imposing] serious risk[s] to the financial 
system.”372 The suggestion is no more than 2 percent for investment banks, 
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and no more than 4 percent for all other banks. Since 1994, the United 
States has had a rule prohibiting any single bank from holding more than 10 
percent of total retail deposits; however, this was waived in 2009 for 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo. Another suggestion is 
that limits on size should not be set by regulators, who could adjust the 
limits as “memories of the recent crisis fade,” but rather by Congress, 
which will then leave the task of enforcing the limits to the regulators.373 
Size limits could create a financial system that is less vulnerable to systemic 
risk, competitive distortions, and the failure of a single bank. 
On the other hand, some have argued that smaller banks are not 
necessarily less risky banks.374 Also, large financial institutions provide 
certain advantages to the economy, especially with regard to the funding of 
large, cross-border companies.375 Therefore, other solutions to the too-big-
to-fail problem have been proposed, such as increased capital requirements 
and better prudential regulation. 
Another idea has been proposed by Joseph Stiglitz, who criticizes 
policies of the Bush and Obama administrations that viewed the mega-
banks as not only too big to fail, but also too big to be resolved or 
financially restructured under normal procedures, whereby shareholders 
would be wiped out and bondholders would be converted to shareholders.376 
His solution for the problem of banks deemed “too big to fail” is to break 
them up for the reason that banks too big to fail are too big to exist.377 
Without evidence that these large banks operate so much more efficiently 
than smaller institutions that it would be costly to restrict their size, Stiglitz 
sees no reason not to break up these large banks. Indeed, the too-big-to-fail 
banks are also too big to be managed; and their competitive advantage 
comes from their “monopoly power” and from “implicit government 
subsidies” and guarantees, not from their size.378 
Stiglitz suggests the big banks return to traditional banking, while their 
“commingled activities” including insurance, investment banking, and other 
activities not essential to the function of commercial banking, be spun 
off.379 While he views size limits as subject to regulatory lapses, he suggests 
a “three-pronged attack”: (1) breaking up institutions that are too big to fail; 
(2) “restricting . . . activities in which [the] remaining institutions can be 
engaged”; and (3) correlating “deposit insurance and capital adequacy 
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restrictions to [even out] the playing field.”380 He acknowledges that 
activity restrictions might “result in lower returns for big banks,” as there 
should also be an elimination of incentive structures in employee 
compensation that “encourage excessive risk-taking and shortsighted 
behavior.”381 Stiglitz also thinks that the Fed and the Treasury Department 
need clearer authority to resolve financial institutions when the failure of an 
institution would put the entire economy at risk.382 This would need to 
happen in conjunction with the break-up of institutions that are too big to 
even exist.383 There is a need for affirmative prevention measures, rather 
than just resolution authority to prevent the same thing from happening 
again.384 
The idea of narrow banking was proposed long before the recent crisis. 
In 1987, Robert Litan suggested that state and federal regulators should not 
allow financial product diversification unless banking and nonbanking 
activities were carried out in separate, but related corporations.385 His idea 
of “narrow” or “safe” banking was the separation of deposit taking from 
risk-bearing activities. This would eliminate the potential risk that 
depositors’ funds would be used to bail out the risky, nonbanking activities, 
or used by the nonbank affiliates, where it would have the greater potential 
to be lost.386 Narrow banks operating with separation requirements would 
only be permitted to “invest[] in high-quality, marketable instruments,” and 
would be restricted from “channel[ing] funds to support affiliated 
corporations or their customers.”387 This would prevent a situation where 
the failure of a nonbanking affiliate would trigger a deposit run on the bank, 
necessitating federal intervention.388 Narrow banking would also address 
the problems associated with the large financial institutions and their 
concentration of economic power, and resolve conflict of interest issues.389 
Litan’s separation and narrow banking ideas were proposed in the context 
of how financial product diversification could progress rapidly while 
protecting the greater financial system against the risks that product 
diversification entails.390 
A more recent version of a similar proposal has the title of “limited 
purpose banking,” limiting banks to their original purpose of acting as an 
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intermediary between borrowers and lenders, and savers and investors.391 
Under this proposal, all financial and insurance companies with limited 
liability, that are engaged in financial intermediation, would operate solely 
as the intermediary, never owning the assets itself or borrowing to invest in 
anything except specific assets needed to run their operations, thereby 
acting similarly to a “pass-through mutual fund.”392 The role of an 
intermediary requires no risk taking at all. Under limited purpose banking, 
banks would be free to sell and act as the intermediary for customers that 
want to invest in any type of mutual fund, including two new types: “cash 
mutual funds and insurance mutual funds.”393 Additionally, under the 
limited purpose banking proposal, all state and federal regulatory 
authorities would be replaced by a single regulatory authority, the “Federal 
Financial Authority,” which would “verify, supervise custody, fully 
disclose, and oversee the rating and trades of all securities” that are 
“purchased, held and sold by the [limited purpose banking] mutual 
funds.”394 
With the limited exception of the Volcker Rule,395 ideas for curbing the 
size, concentration, and complexity of the big banks were rejected in Dodd-
Frank. Instead, the statute embraced better capital adequacy requirements 
and better supervision by financial regulators, and an orderly resolution 
authority in the event such regulation fails to prevent the failure of one or 
more financial institutions. In view of the role that the financial regulators 
played in creating the mega-banks, it is not surprising that efforts to cut 
them down to a smaller size were resisted. Moreover, the actions by these 
agencies in implementing Dodd-Frank are strengthening the dominant 
position of the mega-banks.396 
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